House Resolution 109, introduced on February 1, 2019 by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) is better known as the Green New deal (GND).  Although only 14 pages long it has been both celebrated as a key climate milestone and demonised as a progressive attempt to wreck the US economy.   

For Democrats, the GND was an important touchstone during the 2020 primaries.  Moderate candidates rejected the GND as admirable but politically unrealistic while more progressive candidates, including the eventual winner Joe Biden, embraced it as an important guide for future action on climate.  Prior to the Presidential election the GND strongly influenced the output of the Biden/Sanders climate task team which in turn became the Democrat policy “Combating the Climate Crisis and Pursuing Environmental Justice”.

What is in (and not in) the GND?

The GND doesn’t set any new, far reaching decarbonisation targets.  In simple terms it reinforces existing, albeit aspirational, decarbonisation targets that the Paris Agreement established to keep global temperature increases below 1.5 C

(A)   global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from human sources of 40 to 60 percent from 2010 levels by 2030; and

(B)   net-zero global emissions by 2050;

While formally introducing these targets into Congress is not a meaningless exercise (even if they were never going to be passed into law), the targets themselves are no more aggressive or binding than those published by high profile environmental groups.  Where the GND creates a new perspective is by taking the climate debate beyond simply achieving net zero emissions – it explicitly links decarbonisation with wealth inequality, poverty and racial discrimination.  This intent is evident in the five goals of the GND listed below

(A) to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions through a fair and just transition for all communities and workers;

(B) to create millions of good, high-wage jobs and ensure prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States;

(C) to invest in the infrastructure and industry of the United States to sustainably meet the challenges of the 21st century;

(D) to secure for all people of the United States for generations to come (i) clean air and water; (ii) climate and community resiliency; (iii) healthy food; (iv) access to nature; and (v) a sustainable environment;

(E) to promote justice and equity by stopping current, preventing future, and repairing historic oppression of indigenous peoples, communities of color, migrant communities, deindustrialized communities, depopulated rural communities, the poor, low-income workers, women, the elderly, the unhoused, people with disabilities, and youth “ 

By bringing this broader perspective into the mainstream of the climate debate, the GND has fundamentally changed the discussion.  It both gives opponents greater more scope to attack action on climate and raises hurdles for sympathetic moderates while also making climate potentially more relevant for disadvantaged minority groups. 

GND Interpretations

Some elements of the GND are clear.  While it calls on the US to rejoin the Paris agreement and show climate leadership, it is unambiguously a document for a domestic US audience.  This overt national focus is somewhat at odds with conventional climate advocacy which typically emphasises the need for nations such as the US to support climate action in the developing world.  The “frontline and vulnerable communities” identified in the GND goals who have suffered “systematic injustices” and “historic oppression” don’t live in developing countries – they are Americans

Other elements are less precise and are really expressions of feel good populism.  For example the desired outcomes of a GND are that a “national, social, industrial, and economic mobilization” to combat climate change will create a “historic opportunity — (1) to create millions of good, high-wage jobs in the United States; (2) to provide unprecedented levels of prosperity and economic security for all people of the United States; and (3) to counteract systemic injustices”.   The first two points could be part of Republican promises linked to tax cuts and reducing regulatory red tape and the final point, while clearly Democrat, could be from the original New Deal or President Johnson’s Great Society initiative

However, the greatest scope for different GND interpretations lies with the nature of the linkage between climate on the one hand and inequality, poverty and racial injustice on the other.  Do these all have equal priority or does reducing emissions and averting a climate catastrophe have primacy?  Is the GND simply reinforcing mainstream climate advocacy highlighting that an imminent climate crisis will exacerbate inequality, poverty and racial injustice? Or is the GND going further and recognising that action on climate gives society an opportunity to not just alleviate current failings but to build a new energy economy that is structurally resistant to all forms of injustice?   

Climate moderates can use this ambiguity to maintain a more or less mainstream climate position that continues to prioritise the reduction of carbon emissions.  This thinking sees the GND as providing an aspirational framework, influencing the primary work of decarbonisation in the hope that opportunities to improve inequality, poverty and racial injustice are captured as society moves away from fossil fuels.  Hard line supporters, however, don’t see ambiguity, guidelines or aspirational targets – they want the Biden administration to make real progress toward all five of the GND goals. 

Is the GND an ill considered over reach…

Conservative analysts clearly see the GND as a massive over reach and a self indulgent progressive error, a conclusion reinforced during the initial GND rollout when Ocasio-Cortez and allies like Sunrise Movement leader Varshini Prakash allowed the GND to be conflated with an even broader swathe of progressive demands like universal healthcare and a guaranteed income which were not formally part of the resolution.

Put simply, anti-climate Republicans see the GND as providing compelling evidence that climate action is being used as a vehicle to drive radical societal change in the pursuit of federal government controlled socialist utopia.  Risks associated with the GND were prominent in Republican commentary on the recent Texas power crisis and will, no doubt, be part of 2022 mid term election messaging.

The GND also cuts across conventional climate talking points which balance discussion on the catastrophic effects of increasing global temperatures with positive messages about achievable decarbonisation pathways.  These talking points seek to avoid creating the impression that climate action is too hard, worried that the general public will disengage from an issue that seems impossible to resolve.  The breadth of the GND will worry advocates who see the challenges of overcoming intrenched political opposition and developing new energy options for electric power, transport and key industrial processes as tough enough without adding the burden of solving intractable issues like improved US race relations, healthcare reform and eliminating poverty. 

Conservatives will obviously be happy if traditional climate activists publicly reject GND supporters as naïve idealists.

…Or a strategic master stroke?

If the GND is to prove its critics wrong it will be because it makes climate action more relevant to more people.  The advocacy challenge for climate action that it represents short term pain for long term benefit.  This trade off resonates with those in a comfortable economic position who can afford to prioritise the future over the present.  Marginalised and impoverished groups can’t do this – while they may express concern over climate change this is inevitably secondary (or even further down the list) to more pressing issues such as housing, financial security and getting access to affordable healthcare and education for their families.  The GND, with its overt domestic focus, its clear annunciation of the groups it seeks to help and the promise of economic gain and compensation for past grievances is targeting individuals and groups that currently see climate as someone else’s battle.   This perspective recognises that climate has been and for the most part remains an issue for white, tertiary educated Americans.  It also reflects a logic that sees the creation of a broader, more engaged coalition of climate support as critical to making rapid action on climate a political reality.

The GND seeks to energise a climate coalition of the economically disadvantaged by promising that they will be major beneficiaries of a new energy economy.  The GND energy transformation calls for   “transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities, labor unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups, academia, and businesses”.  These groups are effectively being promised not just a seat at the table but that they will be genuine players.  In a GND world, groups traditionally excluded from the spoils of technical innovation will receive “appropriate ownership stakes and returns on investment, adequate capital (including through community grants, public banks, and other public financing), technical expertise, supporting policies, and other forms of assistance “. 

Current climate messaging can stereotype marginalised groups as victims who need to be protected.  This can seem patronising and offers only the avoidance of further impact from a warming climate as a reward for engagement. The GND offers more – it offers these groups a share of the spoils.  It may be unkind to portray the GND as a bribe, but is supporters hope it will be seen by its target audience as more generous and more inclusive than prior inducements.

In addition to outreach to disadvantaged groups, the GND also has an inherently positive message.   The GND is implicitly saying that decarbonisation is happening and rather than worrying about whether it happens fast enough we should be ensuring that investments are being made with a under an appropriate regulatory and public policy framework.  This bolder, more muscular mindset will appeal to those who find some climate advocacy too negative, too focussed on the threat of impending catastrophe and not sufficiently focussed on the risk that the green revolution could simply mean replacing one group of all powerful corporations with another.  There is, in fact, much to support a GND inspired shift that recognises the current reality of energy market transformation – coal production and usage has collapsed, wind and solar generation are growing rapidly and the stock market sees Tesla as the automotive maker of the future. 

When will the verdict be in?

Putting aside the obvious reality that the GND is not the only issue impacting US climate policy, the first major test of its impact is likely to be the mid terms in 2022.  If Republicans successfully use the GND to spearhead assault on Democrat policies and win sizeable majorities in both houses then it could well be labelled an ill-considered overreach with, first President Biden and then leading Democrat presidential candidates walking back support. 

If, however, polling and the mid term results show increased support for climate action among minority and marginalised groups and these groups start to demand greater oversight and involvement in decarbonisation projects Democrats might realise they are onto something.  Numbers count in politics so policies that encourage voter turnout and engagement will be absorbed into party orthodoxy.  This will especially be the case if the corporations leading the green revolution start to look indistinguishable to big oil and the Detroit auto giants.

It may be that the corporations at the leading edge of climate action hold the key to how history regards the GND.  If they seek community engagement and support, implement hiring practices that emphasise diversity and are prepared to share some of the spoils of victory they may head off the most stringent GND demands.  Corporate green leaders currently have a store of progressive goodwill and if they are clever they will work hard to stay on the right side of public opinion.  It is worthy noting, however, that the big tech companies were once held in similar regard but lost popularity as they grew larger and accumulated vast stores of information and collected massive digital profits.   If wind, solar and electric vehicle corporations don’t learn these lessons, the GND offers a view of potential future progressive action.