The COP 26 climate conference scheduled for November in Glasgow has been postponed to an unknown future date. Given the current state of the corona pandemic this is hardly surprising and no doubt the key climate players will continue to collaborate remotely. The postponement does, however, raise the question about how the global battle with the corona virus will impact the trajectory of global decarbonisation.
For the average punter, battling through social distancing and potentially loss of income, there are now only snippets of climate related news filtering through. Investment in new wind and solar installations is slowing as financial markets digest the implications of a corona shutdown. Huge, post corona budget deficits will seem more likely to lead to future tax increases or austerity measures than promoting renewed action on climate.
For a variety of reasons, including a corona led slump in demand, oil and gas prices have fallen off a cliff – if this continues will it hurt growth in renewables? Is the argument that renewable energy is now cheaper than fossil fuels still valid? Will renewable investment be stalled until oil and gas prices rebound?
Reduced road and air traffic as well as lower industrial power demand is leading to lower CO2 emissions. This will be welcomed by some but others will see it as evidence that decarbonisation and economic growth are inversely related. Activists will pick up on both these messages in coming weeks to push their different agendas.
Corporate bailouts may have a decarbonisation angle – will governments or public pressure force faster climate action on recipient industries? Democrats in the US, for example, have suggested that any support for airlines should be tied to decarbonisation commitments.
The pandemic has meant more discussion on modelling being used to predict the rate of corona infections and the potential death toll. Some universities and think tanks may have rushed out with what might be seen as outlandish or scattergun forecasts. If predictions of multiple millions of deaths are out by an order of magnitude or two will this be used to discredit climate modelling? This may not be fair to climate models which have been refined over several decades but that does not mean questions won’t be asked.
For most, the post corona world will be influenced by how long it takes to get there and how much pain is absorbed in the process. If things turn around quickly and the general population is buoyed by the power of collective action to achieve a common good, it is possible politicians may face a renewed call for faster action of decarbonisation. This, however, seems an unlikely outcome and if global economies are tipped into recession, unemployment skyrockets and society is weary of austere social constraints, climate might be regarded as an issue that can wait. My guess is that climate has slipped well down the priority list for most people and the longer we battle through the corona emergency and the more governments struggle to micro manage the lives of individual citizens the harder it will be to quickly get back into decarbonisation programs.
For governments looking to jump start a stalled economy emerging from a corona hibernation, investment in public works might be seen as both popular and necessary. This sort of depression era, new deal approach could easily include climate related projects such as new wind, solar and storage projects as well as the installation of electric vehicle infrastructure. The likelihood of this sort of nation building approach (as well as the inclusion of climate projects in the program) depends, as discussed further below, on how well government overall is perceived to have handled the corona fight and which of the competing climate advocacy narratives best captures the post corona mood of the general public.
If the standing of government is enhanced by a tough but successful battle with corona there will be plenty of progressive voices calling for an expanded role for central government, not just for climate action, but across a broader range of issues. Obviously conservatives and moderates will be seeking to find arguments to counter a progressive shift and promote various mid ground positions. The strongest argument against a permanent big government takeover might be massive corona related deficits that need to be addressed.
It is hard to overestimate the quantum of change that has occurred in the last month – free market fundamentals have been temporarily abandoned and many in society are now dependent on government action for both their personal safety and their economic survival. Some commentators are suggesting that this signals the end of laissez-faire neoliberalism – it is probably a bit early to make this call but if recent, highly interventionist government actions are perceived to have been both necessary and successful we will see pressure for big government to continue after corona. This obviously has important implications for future climate action.
Prior to the corona outbreak there was division between moderates and progressives on whether to position climate as a standalone issue or make it part of a broader, more ambitious agenda. The more progressive model is exemplified by the US Green New Deal – not just zero carbon by 2035 (or some other aggressive timing) but also free education and healthcare, government guaranteed employment and reduced wealth inequality. While it looks unlikely that Bernie Sanders will be the next president his spin on the green new deal had direct federal government ownership of new low carbon generation assets. His model is currently an outlier compared with the consensus which favours governments providing incentives for private investment, but in an era of stronger government it may become more mainstream (if not in the US then perhaps elsewhere).
In the wake of corona disruption, will the progressive model win out over more pragmatic approaches? Those pushing for green new deal packages will be building on pre-corona momentum, not just related to climate concerns, but also on excessive globalisation and growing wealth inequality. Opposing this are pragmatists who regard the policies such as the green new deal as worthy long term goals but unachievable in the medium term. This, in my view, is a key philosophical point for climate activists – in the long term are their goals favoured by treating decarbonisation as a discrete engineering challenge or encouraging it to become a plank in a broader program?
For climate activists there are perhaps a couple of risks – firstly if progressive leaders and commentators get the upper hand will they push for too much, too quickly? Does rolling climate into a broader progressive program risk having the lot rejected by a weary public who simply want to regain a sense of normality?
Secondly, if society accepts a shift toward more interventionist government where do these governments actually put their interventionist energies. We have already seen in the US Democratic primaries that healthcare was a more potent issue than decarbonisation so it is possible that climate advocates could be disappointed by their cause not getting the top billing the feel it deserves.
If, on the other hand, central governments are seen to have failed to plan for and respond adequately to the corona pandemic it will be easier for small government advocates to make the case for a return to something based on neoliberal principles. As I have discussed elsewhere it may actually be to the long term advantage of climate activists for decarbonisation to become more bipartisan. If, post corona big government is rejected, does that favour centre right groups? Some of these may follow the path of UK conservatives and build on the popularity of measured climate action among wealthy, traditionally conservative voters. Obviously opposition parties will be rewarded if incumbents have stumbled, so timing may be a blessing in some countries, but new governments need to be careful with a dispirited and cynical public. It is hard to see this leading to rapid uptake of decarbonisation actions irrespective of the goals of the new government.
Perceptions of a shambolic government performance that cost lives and exacerbated the economic impact will play into the hands of more hard line anti-climate groups who promote and feed off a lack of respect for government and traditional institutions in their advocacy.
We are already seeing early signs of an uber liberatian argument questioning the cost benefit of massive government intervention into everyday life. This is the not wanting the “cure to be worse than the disease” line being periodically pushed by President Trump. Some anti-government polemics will veer off into crazy conspiracy land but there will be arguments questioning if the extent of economic devastation and gross intrusion into everyday personal liberties was really needed. At the moment the average citizen seems to be broadly supportive of and is willing to accept the current level of government intervention as a reasonable price to pay for preserving public health. In six or even twelve months time this support may not be so universal.
How accusations of government overreach resonate will depend on the post pandemic attitudes, if they again credence they will certainly be used to oppose more interventionist government policies. Disquiet over government overreach will spill over into climate specific advocacy – overreach in responding to corona will become overreach in responding to the alleged problem of climate change.
However things play out, climate advocates wont have things all their own way – especially if they encourage their goals to be incorporated into broad based, “more of the above” set of big government policies.
The discussion above has focussed on central government, it is possible that local and state governments may emerge with a heightened standing relative to central authorities. While Australia seems to be solidly bipartisan at the moment, this is not the case in the US where a combination of upcoming elections and different corona exposures are resulting in tensions between the federal government and the states as well as between some of the states. In some countries, local and state governments will emerge with an enhanced mandate and greater willingness to take the lead on climate. A shift toward greater state or provincial leadership might actually be a better model for some climate initiatives. As an example, encouraging a faster uptake of electric vehicles might be much easier for local governments based in urban settings than other government entities responsible for a more diverse set of citizens.
How the general public see their own role could also be important – this will be a subset of how they rate government performance but where citizens feel they collectively and successfully rose to meet the corona challenge there may be a new “can do” attitude that flows into meeting decarbonisation challenges. European nations might not feel this way but things may be different in Australia and New Zealand as long as climate friendly doesn’t mean too many additional sacrifices. Hopefully China and/or the US feel the same, though the odds are probably against this.
Overall, my sense is that, on a medium term timeline, the better government and the nation overall is seen to have performed, the more positive this is for climate momentum. Even where the government is climate-lite, as is the case in Australia, a positive view on government will help opposition groups push decarbonisation and if well managed play to their advantage at the next election.
As I muse over the possible post corona scenarios I can see some positives and negatives for climate activists. On balance I see more shorter term negatives driven by a period of post corona recovery. Reflecting on the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918/19, my reading suggests the “roaring 20’s” were not a period characterised by sober reflection of the challenges facing society. That said, much of global decarbonisation activity is now part of the industrial sector – wind, solar and EV companies will return to full production when the shutdown ends. What might take a bit longer to get going are programs that need government funding and endorsement. From an Australian perspective we weren’t actually planning on doing anything too ground braking so perhaps haven’t lost much. Climate activists can take some comfort from the fact that a Don Quixotesque coal fired power plant in north Queensland is no closer to reality.
From a longer term perspective the pressure to decarbonise will continue and continue to grow. While climate is off the front pages research and engineering will continue and this may alter the conversation when we get back to talking climate again. I expect oil prices to rebound relatively quickly, despite predictions of a permanent glut. I also expect some nations will try public infrastructure spending as post corona economic therapy and this will almost inevitably have a climate based component.
The fundamental question of whether climate becomes a bipartisan issue (perhaps with different initiatives being prioritised across the political spectrum) or a key plank of a progressive agenda remains. If I were a climate activist I would favour the former but I bet most will favour the latter. The potential for a more activist government role clearly can’t be discounted and if history is any guide this potential will be greater in nations whose economies seem irrevocably shattered. For these, climate can not be a true priority despite rhetoric which will suggest otherwise. My sneaky suspicion is that climate friendly, progreesive administrations will manifest more at a state or even local level, an outcome that some central governments might be very happy with.
